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Given that learning has become a core element in addressing the
ever-increasing complexities in public sector accountability, we
investigate two issues in this paper: (a) how learning was involved
in the process of disseminating a competency framework (CF) in
four state departments in Kerala, India; and (b) an analysis of the
challenges involved in this process, using the theoretical insights
from learning accountability. Although the CF would revitalise gov-
ernance and accountability mechanisms by establishing a conducive
environment for administrators to learn in, the nuances of the
existing administrative structure limited the scope of this learning
exercise. The CF in Kerala generated fear, tension, and resistance
amongst theadministrators, due toaperceivedgapbetween thevery
objectives of the CF and the administrative settings, in which learn-
ingwas insignificant. The paper argues that imposing public adminis-
trators’ accountability reforms, such as theCF,would bemeaningless
until an emphasis is placed on learning accountability. Furthermore,
there is a need to “unlearn” or “discard” the prevailing traditional
learning and accountability practices; unless this is achieved, a
conducive environment for learning accountability cannot be
institutionalised, nor can reforms such as the CF bematerialised.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Strong institutions of governance, reinforced by well-functioning public administration, are fundamental for address-
ing the contemporary challenges and opportunities of sustainable development. There is an ever-increasing need
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2to identify and develop public administrators with appropriate competencies, to engage with the needs of citizens,
and to benchmark their performance and accountability (Parry, 2005). Despite the importance of providing public
administrators with appropriate methods of learning, and of enhancing their required competencies, these concepts
have drawn relatively little attention in the public sector accountability literature. The competency framework (CF)
is reckoned to be an important tool in instigating broader cultural changes in human resource management (HRM),
and for restoring learning accountability aspects in an organisation (Brans & Hondeghem, 2005; Horton, 2000; Lodge
& Hood, 2005; Nybø, 2004). Claims have been made that competency-based human resource bundles enable public
sector entities to build skilful workforces by offering continuous learning, and by ensuring a good match between the
tasks and the employees’ skills (Hoffmann, 1999; Vos, Hauw, &Willemse, 2015). Thus, we have two objectives in this
paper. First, we investigate how learning was involved in the process of disseminating a CF in four state departments
in the Indian state of Kerala. Second, we explore the key challenges emerging in this process, in order to reveal the
issues that stifle learning accountability in the public sector of emerging economies.
The adoption of the CF in western counties is linked to the pursuance of coherent HRM systems, often referred to
as “human resource bundles” (Gooderham, Parry, & Ringdal, 2008; Horton, 2000; Nybø, 2004). The UK Civil Service
has adopted a framework consisting of 10 competencies, grouped into three clusters: “set direction,” “engage people,”
and “deliver results” (CSHR, 2017). In its CF for upper level public administrators, the OECD (2014) applied 15 core
competencies, which are further grouped into three different clusters: strategic, interpersonal, and delivery-related
competencies. The application of the CF is also evident in the public administration of Belgium (Brans & Hondeghem,
1999), the Netherlands (Van Der Meer & Toonen, 2005), and Germany (Page, Hood, & Lodge, 2005). Brans and
Hondeghem (2005) state that competency approaches have started drawing more attention in the public sector, in
order to make and keep individual public administrators effective in delivering on their promises. However, fewer
studies have examined the adoption of the CF, particularly in the context of the public sector in emerging economies.
Prior studies on management control and grassroots work discuss how traditional attitudes, behaviours, and
culture towards risk-taking undermine learning and innovations in public sector organisations (Ferry & Ahrens, 2017;
Ferry, Coombs, & Eckersley, 2017); limited focus, however, is placed on learning elements and their role in discharging
accountability. Nevertheless, over the years, learning has become a core element in addressing the ever-increasing
complexities in public sector accountability. The theoretical insights of this paper are drawn from the learning aspect
of public sector accountability (Bovens, 2007; Bovens, Schillemans, & Hart, 2008). In particular, we move beyond the
financial and control aspect of accountability, which is predominant in extant work, and bring out the role of learning
tools such as theCF in achieving public sector accountability.Moreover, accountability in the public sector has become
increasingly complex and elusive (Cooper & Lapsley, 2019; Hagbjer, Kraus, Lind, & Sjogren, 2017). Changes that have
taken place in the public sector in the last three decades, either adhering to New Public Management (NPM) or
instigating a movement towards New Public Governance (NPG), all have at their core the objective of improving gov-
ernance and accountability; although different processes and tools are proposed for achieving these aims (Almquist,
Grossi, vanHelden, &Reichard, 2013;Hood, 1995; Virtanen, Stenvall, Kinder, &Hatam, 2018).Whether these reforms
represent a progressive movement towards managing public administration, and the extent to which these reforms
complement each other, have remained contested (Hyndman & Liguori, 2016). What is more noticeable is that these
reforms have resulted in a web of accountability arrangements and that learning has become important for the public
administrators to address such arrangements made by multiple constituents, including the citizens (Hagbjer et al.,
2017). However, the fact that public sector accountability also consists of continuous learning is rarely acknowledged
in extant work (Bovens, 2007, 2010; Bovens et al., 2008).
Although public sector accountability reforms in India have led to a greater focus on enhanced human resource
capacity and skills development than existed previously (Budhwar, 2009), a lack of professional expertise has contin-
ued to become an important challenge in public administration. Guha (2016) states that generalists comprehensively
dominate most of the public sector jobs in India based on their seniority. No major changes have been made to this
situation, despite the importance of domain specialisation being highlighted by various reports, such as by the Con-
stitution Review Commission of 2002 and the Second Administrative Reforms Commission of 2008. Furthermore,
3Haq (2012) finds that the underperformance of public administrators in the delivery of assigned jobs in India has
been attributed to a lack of clarity of tasks to be performed by administrators. A blurring job responsibility has made
it difficult to identify the required competencies for different tasks at various levels. This has created obstacles in
designing appropriate training and coaching programmes for public administrators, regarding their capacity develop-
ment (Budhwar&Boyne, 2004; Budhwar&Varma, 2010). Recurring criticisms state that the existingHRM in the public
sector, being a remnant of the colonial legacy, has failed to promote citizen-centric governance and accountability for
results. This has been even more distinct in the state of Kerala, which was once perceived to be the most progressive
state in India in terms of sociopolitical and economic development. For instance, the extent to which decentralised
structures in the state contribute to asset accumulation amongst disadvantaged groups is tied to the wider context
of participatory institutions and opportunities that allow social actors to transform assets into meaningful livelihood
outcomes (Arun, Arun, & Devi, 2011). Irrespective of the high level of social development and civil society, the high
level of unionisation and politicisation in the bureaucracy has resulted in the administration being trapped within a
system of patronage and red tape, in which the introduction of reforms and learning has become insignificant.
In 2014, the Institute of Management in Government (IMG)1 initiated a project of introducing a CF for public
administrators in the selected departments of the state of Kerala. The significance of this initiative was predicated
on the assumption that it would help redress the perceived gap between citizens’ expectations and accountability
in practice (IMG, 2018), and thereby strive for good governance. However, the dissemination of the CF has not pro-
ceeded as intended in these departments, as a result of resistance and inadequate support from the key stakeholders,
including the state mechanisms. Our aim in the paper is to unfold the responses of diverse stakeholders at different
administrative levels in order to understand the challenges to achieving learning accountability.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses public sector accountability, focusing on
the learning aspects. This is followed by Section 3. Section 4 highlights the context of Kerala as providing an impetus
for the CF projects. Section 5 presents our findings, revealing the views of public administrators and other state actors
with regard to the dissemination of the CF, and its rationale for improving accountability. Finally, Section 6 offers
discussion and concluding remarks.
2 LEARNING ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Generally, the notion of accountability has remained elusive, as it is continually evolving and suggests different
meanings to different people (Bovens, 2007, 2010; Koppell, 2005; Luke, 2010; Sinclair, 1995). However, despite
the variations in its interpretation, accountability has proved to be a powerful tool in the public sector in terms of
ensuring good governance and advancing economic growth. Bovens (2007, p. 450) defines public accountability “as
a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her
conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences.” What makes
public sector accountability more complex is the presence of multiple stakeholders: not least the parliament, but also
executive branches, oversight agencies, external resource providers and citizens, exercising the authority of the forum
under certain circumstances asking accounts from their subordinates, and for service provision they are expected to
deliver (Luke, 2010). Bovens (2010) also mentions legal, professional, and other types of public accountability, whose
functioning extends beyond the necessity to have clearly defined principal–agent relationships.
A major critique that pervades the public sector relates to an excessive focus on budgetary compliance and the
discharging of hierarchical accountability to parliament (the forum), while there are no direct mechanisms to promote
efficiency and effectiveness in resource mobilisation and service delivery, or to address the concerns of the citizens
and communities. Reforms triggered in the public sector in the last three decades have at their heart a desire to
extend both the scope and quality of public sector accountability beyond budgetary compliance, in order to improve
the results and outcomes of the resources consumed, and to connect the reforms with the welfare of citizens and
communities (Hagbjer et al., 2017; Hyndman & Liguori, 2016;Wiesel &Modell, 2014).
4For instance, NPM emphasises the adoption of private-sector managerial techniques in the running of public
entities, whereby the public administrators and citizens are envisaged more as managers and customers, respectively
(Hood, 1995). Hierarchical accountability to top-level authorities has continued under NPM, but public administrators
are also required to discharge their accountability to clients (citizens) through efficient service delivery, and by
ensuring the results and outputs of resources entrusted to them (Hagbjer et al., 2017; Hood, 1995; Hyndman &
Lapsley, 2016). NPG is envisaged as more of a movement towards governance that promotes trust, networks, and
collaboration at grassroots levels. A greater involvement of citizens and interest groups in governance, service
delivery, and decision-making are considered paramount at a time when many local governments are experiencing
budget cuts and austerity (Ferry et al., 2017). Different notions of accountability are therefore predicated with a
view to strengthening the governance momentum; not least social accountability and output-based accountability,
assuming democratic deliberation and the delivery of public value (Alawattage & Azure, 2019; Almquist et al., 2013;
Bracci, Garliardo, & Bigoni, 2014; Ferry, Ahrens, & Khalifa, 2019; Hyndman & Liguori, 2016). In general, both the
managerial (output-based) and social accountabilities advocated by such reforms have drawn considerable academic
criticism (Cooper & Lapsley, 2019; Grubnic & Cooper, 2019; Wiesel & Modell, 2014). One of the few exceptions is
perhaps the study by Ferry and Ahrens (2017), in which the authors delineated how localism combined with austerity
has served as a powerful external source of change for a UK local authority (Newcastle City Council), and resulted in
enabling corporate governance practice to serve the public interest. In another study conducted in the Newcastle City
Council, Ferry et al. (2019) showed how austerity localism has forced the council to employ public value strategy.
For instance, while discussing the outcomes ofmanagerialism in theUnitedKingdom, Lapsley (2009) has delineated
how the NPM toolkit tends to prevent rather than deliver intended results and accountability. Narayan, Northcott,
and Parker (2017) state that accountability demands imposed upon universities as part of their commercialisation
has limited researchers’ autonomy, thereby damaging the culture of innovation and creativity. Employing Simon’s
“lever of control” framework, Ferry et al. (2017) show how austerity has made redundant the very objectives of
localism introduced as part of NPM in the United Kingdom, thereby restricting innovations and preserving local
authorities’ preference to maintain budgetary control and hierarchal accountability. Scholars such as Kim and Han
(2015) and Cooper and Lapsley (2019) argue that NPM has further increased the level of bureaucracy in discharging
accountability, as the administrators themselves are required to design andmanage the process of changes.
In a similar vein, Grubnic and Cooper (2019) discuss the challenges that members of Health andWellbeing Boards
(HWBs) in the United Kingdom have experienced in discharging multiple accountabilities within the wider NPG
reforms. The mechanisms advocated by NPG for democratic renewal and public value creation—including participa-
tory budgeting, citizens’ and neighbourhood forums, and citizens’ juries—have also experienced increasing resistance,
and have failed to foster trust between citizens and politicians (Hyndman & Liguori, 2016). For example, mechanisms
such as participatory budgeting emphasises promoting citizen empowerment rather than individual learnings (Van
Helden & Uddin, 2016). Moreover, the fact that the motives of citizens’ participation can be very different from the
propagated ones has largely been neglected when promoting such governance reforms. For instance, in their study
of “austerity localism,” Ahrens and Ferry (2015) demonstrate how the grassroots’ groups at Newcastle City Council
(United Kingdom) were offered greater scope to engage in determining local policies and services, to produce a
consensus on local spending cuts. In many emerging economies, citizens’ engagements and participatory budgeting
has become ameans for politicians to promote patronage andmaintain their tenure, rather than facilitating social and
output-oriented accountability and engendering public value (Célérier & Botey, 2015).
Learning aspects of accountability are rarely acknowledged when discussing the accountability arrangements
within both NPM and NPG reforms. Instead, scholars have continued their debate on the accountability crisis in
the public sector (Bovens, 2010). The literature has reflected on this crisis by applying terms such as “the web of
accountability arrangements” (Bovens et al., 2008), “accountability dilemma” (Behn, 2001), and “accountability trap”
(Van Thiel & Leeuw, 2003). For instance, Hagbjer et al. (2017) have highlighted various strategies that those account-
able can adopt, including decoupling, structural differentiation, role attribution, and compromising, to deal with
perceived ambiguities in public sector accountability. Similarly, Ahrens and Ferry (2015) discuss the efforts of a local
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groups.
Ongoing debates, however, signal a shift in discussions from accountability deficits to accountability overload
(Schillemans, 2011; Willems & Van Dooren, 2011). In practice, both NPM and NPG public sector reforms have simply
entangled administrators in the web of accountability arrangements, which at times overlap and conflict with each
other (Bovens, 2007; Bovens et al., 2008; Ferry, Eckersley, & Zakaria, 2015), without equipping them with skills and
competencies required to handle such tasks (Lapsley, 2009). Thus, learning aspects of accountability are largely silent
in the discussion of both the NPM- and NPG-based accountability arrangements. Messner (2009) argues that too
much accountability, as experienced by contemporary public administrators, can become an ethically problematic
burden, damaging both their motivation and morale. Furthermore, the accountability overload can stifle innovative
and entrepreneurial behaviour of public administrators, and undermine the very objective of reforms itself (Bovens
et al., 2008; Koppell, 2005; Schillemans, 2011; Virtanen et al., 2018).
Conflicts, tensions, and resistance to reforms are not surprisingwhen public administrators are exposed tomultiple
accountability relationships (Luke, 2010; Narayan et al., 2017). For instance, Adhikari and Jayasinghe (2017) have
delineated how the externally purposed public sector accounting reforms, with a rhetoric of improved governance
and accountability, contradicted the existing operating contexts; they were thus resisted by multiple stakeholders,
including government accountants, officials, and auditors. Such tensions and resistance, resulted from a demand
for multiple accountabilities, can potentially be mitigated by ensuring that each individual public administrator is
equipped with required skills and competencies that are identifiable and measurable. This demands greater attention
to learning accountability, in which the central focus is on continuous improvements (Crawford, Morgan, & Cordery,
2018; Ferry et al., 2015; Horton, 2000; Luke, 2010; Nybø, 2004). For instance, Virtanen et al. (2018) have discussed
a service systems perspective, placing front line managers and users at the centre of service provision and account-
ability. They emphasise the need for building intelligent organisations that align the service environment with staff
capacity-building, and embedding a culture of continuous learning and adoption.
Although organisational learning, including the application of management control systems in facilitating learning,
has been extensively covered in prior work (Bol & Moers, 2010; Ferry et al., 2017; Levitt & March, 1988; Pant, 2001),
the role of accountability in promoting learning in pursuit of continuous improvement has received less attention
in the literature (Van Acker & Bouckaert, 2018). Brodtrick (1998) argues that learning tends to be stifled once an
organisation institutionalises its own culture. This is perhaps more striking in the public sector, as its entities are
alleged to have a lack of flexibility, dynamism, and innovativeness, due to their enduring preference for maintaining
budget stewardship. For instance, in their study of local authorities in the United Kingdom, Ferry et al. (2017) show
how the factors such as austerity, centralised budgetary restrictions, and pressures to deliver a balanced revenue
budget have restricted management control innovations, and thwarted the learning attitude of public sector entities.
For learning to take place in the public sector context, entities are required to identify their core competencies, rethink
the processes, and set up a dynamic learning culture. This requires the enforcement of an appropriate learning tool,
the CF being an example (Brodtrick, 1998).
Scholars such as Argyris and Schon (1978) and Bovens et al. (2008) have emphasised the role of individual learning
within organisations by introducing the learning aspects of accountability, in which the latter is connected to “deutero
learning,” that is, an institutionalised capacity to learn (p. 232). Bovens (2007) states that public accountability also
concerns motivating individual administrators to search for more intelligent ways of discharging their assigned roles
and responsibilities at multiple levels. Searching for intelligent and innovative ways of delivering tasks is paramount,
as the clients (citizens) and other stakeholders are provided with the mechanisms to sanction public administrators
in the event of errors and shortcomings. In intelligent organisations, public administrators are aware of the issues,
such as what is expected of them, what works, and what does not (Bovens, 2007, p. 463; Bovens et al., 2008). Public
administrators have therefore the opportunity to review and readjust the effectiveness of their performance in
achieving both social and functional goals, and maintaining a balanced relationship with heterogeneous stakeholders
(Crawford et al., 2018). Willems and Van Dooren (2011) state that the learning aspects are central to the discharging
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way to promote acceptance of governments’ authority and citizens’ confidence in contemporary societies, inwhich the
citizens and other interest groups are becoming increasingly critical towards the government, given the ever-growing
need to provide public value (Bovens, 2007; Bracci et al., 2014; Cooper & Lapsley, 2019; Ferry et al., 2019).
Lindblom (1965) has developed a broader understanding of learning accountability, referring to it as “the intel-
ligence of democracy,” the superiority of which is predicated on its ability to promote pluralistic democracy, which
offers a great number of incentives to encourage intelligence and individual learning in the process of policymaking.
Bovens (2007) mentions that this aspect of accountability has great potential to articulate a pluralistic (deliberate)
form of democracy and social and output-oriented accountability more effectively, by offering the required skills
and competencies to individual public administrators. In an ideal situation, learning accountability needs to generate
information about the administrators’ functioning, and to improve performance by reflecting on the achievements and
challenges of their past activities. Bovens et al. (2008) state that the very notion of accountability can only be realised
in the public sector when public administrators start generating and acting upon external feedback regarding their
performance. It is therefore vital that public administrators be provided with certain tools that could stimulate their
continuous learning and self-evaluation of their performance. However, little regard has been given to specifying such
tools throughwhich learning accountability can be enacted and practised in the public sector. Even less is known about
how public administrators respond to such tools in practice, particularly in emerging economy contexts. Therefore,
we argue in this paper that the CF can be an integral component of learning accountability in the public sector, given
its focus on enhancing the capacity and effectiveness of public administrators by equipping them with competencies,
in order to become more responsive to the needs of public services. By examining the dissemination of the CF in
the state of Kerala, the study extends the research on the challenges involved in the institutionalisation of learning
accountability in the public sector of emerging economies.
3 RESEARCH METHOD
Data for the study were derived from three main sources: document analysis, semistructured interviews, and obser-
vations of participants in the dissemination workshops held in Kerala. We commenced our research by reviewing the
documents on the CF and accountability that have been published by the IMG and the Government of Kerala since
2010. The purpose of document analysis was to generate preliminary insights into the competency definitions applied;
reasons for enforcing the CF in state departments; identifying the expected benefits of the CF for state departments;
and gaining an understanding of themethods used in determining duties, responsibilities, and competencies for public
administrators. Given that many of the documents and competencies have been developed in consultation with staff
members, document analysis proved valuable in terms of identifying and approaching the key stakeholders and admin-
istrators involved in disseminating theCF in four state-level departments. The key documentswe reviewed included: ()
handbooks on duties and responsibilities of the Social JusticeDepartment, the Scheduled TribesDevelopmentDepart-
ment, the Police Department, and the Panchayat (Local Self-Government) Department; (2) the CF for civil servants in
these four departments; (3) the civil services competencydictionary; and (4) theCF for functionaries (seeAppendix1a).
Forty semistructured interviews, which included three follow-up interviews, were conducted over a period of
3 years (2016–2018). This method was useful for collecting in-depth information on stakeholders’ opinions, thoughts,
experiences, and feelings on the dissemination of competencies.Most of the interviewswere conducted collectively in
the presence of all coauthors. In some instances where not all coauthors were involved in undertaking interviews, we
ensured that there was sufficient collaboration in developing interview formats before the interviews, and exchanged
the interview transcripts on the same day, to ensure the continuity and shared knowledge aspects of the process.
To contact potential informants, we mobilised both the networks of two native coauthors and snowball sampling.
In addition to the informants from the IMG, we also interviewed former and current senior civil servants of the
Government of Kerala, and officers at different levels in four state-level departments that were piloting the CF,
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started our interviews by asking the informants open-ended questions about their knowledge on theCF.We continued
by discussing their engagement in the process of determining and developing competencies for administrators with
varied roles and responsibilities; learning that occurred in the process of disseminating competencies; the use of
competencies in continuous learning and discharging accountability; and the challenges experienced in disseminating
the CF at different administrative levels. We aimed to generate a comprehensive understanding of how learning
took place in the process of disseminating the CF both at the individual and organisational levels, and how the CF
functioned as a tool for developing learning accountability. The interviews, conductedmostly in English andMalayalam
(regional language), lasted between 30 and 90 min. Before the interviews, we assured the respondents that their
anonymitywould be preservedwhenwe present and analyse their views and observations.With participants’ consent,
all interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed in English by the authors. The verbatim transcription took
place immediately after the interviews, followed promptly by discussions that included all authors. This helped us
share a common understanding of all the relevant issues in a time-boundmanner.
We had the opportunity to review the same set of stakeholders over a period of time by attending the subsequent
workshops in 2017, 2018, and 2019. Although a greater momentum towards the CF was generated during these
3 years, the process faced challenges at different levels. Our representative sample therefore included different
categories of public administrators in different state departments and at different administrative echelons. We
observed that at the individual level, all participants attending the workshops were enthusiastic about the CF. An
element of learningwas evident, as the administratorswere involved in determining competencies for positionswithin
their respective departments, and many of them had become change agents. These administrators perceived the CF
as a learning tool that would enable them to deliver the assigned duties more efficiently and effectively. However,
at the organisational level, the existing bureaucratic system appeared to be a key impediment to disseminating the
CF as intended. Many of the interviewed administrators at the top level were relatively unconvinced, compared with
middle-level administrators, about the CF’s applicability across the full range of departments. This might be partly
due to a lack of clear commitment by top-level government to pursue the CF project further. These observations
provided us with additional insights into the bureaucratic structure of the state, and the influence of trade unions and
other associations in the day-to-day running of public administration, all of which could have an adverse impact on
the process of learning and discharging accountability. Over the duration of 3 years, we have had the opportunity to
ensure the reliability and validity of our interview data by undertaking three follow-up interviews (see Appendix 1b),
as well as to clarify emerging issues.
Based on the transcriptions and recorded data, we identified the most valuable data for the discussed issues.
Firstly, we listed the views and issues frequently expressed by our interviewees in the process of disseminating the
CF. Following this, we identified the learning elements present in this process, and the way the CF served as a tool
for continuous learning and accountability. Based on these responses, we developed a number of themes, such as
selecting departments for piloting the CF; the learning process involved in the CF’s dissemination; responses to the CF
by public administrators at different levels; and the factors influencing the dissemination process, amongst others. At
the last stage, the data representing the themes were clustered, and we endeavoured to establish a link between the
themes, so as to create narratives of the process involved, and the challenges faced in disseminating the CF project in
four departments of the state of Kerala.
4 COMPETENCY FRAMEWORK: THE EXPEIENCE OF KERALA
Public administration in India has experienced a series of changes in the last decade, which resemble the NPM trend
(Budhwar & Boyne, 2004). As part of the reforms, several financial measures, including performance budgeting, zero-
based budgeting, and more recently, output-based budgeting, have been introduced across public entities (Gomes,
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rule-based approaches, in delivering public services and discharging public accountability. A striking aspect of the
reforms taking place in India, as compared to other emerging economies, is perhaps an extended focus on the profes-
sionalisation of the civil service and the capacity development of civil servants, mainly at the state level. The 12th five-
year plan and the report by the Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC), both issued in 2008, as well as the 2012
Right to Service Charter, had all urged state governments to search for initiatives to professionalise the civil service, as
part of establishing more service-oriented and citizen-centric civil servants (IMG, 2018). Professionalisation has been
envisaged as a way of making public administrators more accountable, and of delivering better public services.
In 2014, the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, in collaboration with the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP), set up a project, “Pathways for an Inclusive Indian Administration” (PIA), to search
for the measures needed to professionalise public administration. The PIA team released a report incorporating
the competency-based administrative reforms for Indian Civil Services (ICS) (IMG, 2018). As part of disseminating
these reforms, a dictionary of competencies for public administrators was issued and circulated at the state level;
this reflected both public service values and the essence of good governance and citizen-centric service delivery,
underpinned by the four building blocks of the ICS: ethos, ethics, equity, and efficiency (IMG, 2014). Three state
departments—the Police, Social Justice, and Scheduled Tribes Development—were selected for the first phase
of piloting the CF. The piloting of the CF gained further momentum in 2016 after it was extended to the Local
Self-Government (Panchayats) Department.
Amongst Indian states that are experimenting with CF, Kerala has become the first to maintain high performance
in public service delivery and accountability. Historically, the state has earned a reputation for being a frontrunner
in introducing a number of social transformations from the 19th century onwards, which have resulted in instigat-
ing a range of administrative initiatives. A high rate of literacy, advanced social indicators, and welfare provisions
reflecting those prevailing in western countries have encouraged the state to introduce new measures for improving
accountability and service provision. However, the drawback of the state has been its mediocre public administration
driven by a historically established administrative culture, which tends to stifle rather than stimulate the changes
introduced. The IMGwas therefore quick to adopt theCF, as the latter appeared to be a tool thatwould professionalise
HRM and pave the way for setting up citizen-centric governance and accountability (IMG, 2014). Several benefits
of the CF for departments, superior officers, employees, state governments, and citizens were propagated, which
promoted its dissemination (IMG, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2018). For instance, departments can link organisational and
personal objectives, andmake employees aware of their expected performance. The officers can use the framework to
structure the employees’ development and training needs; consequently, employees can gain a better insight into the
department’s strategy, learn new skills in discharging multiple accountability relationships, and increase their career
progression. In a similar vein, governments can evaluate public service delivery more transparently, and the citizens
would receive high-quality services promptly.
5 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
This section consists of two parts. First, we analyse the process of disseminating the CF and the learning activities that
took place in this process. Next, we present the factors that impeded the dissemination of the CF, thus shedding light
on the challenges that the CF and learning accountability can face in an emerging economy context, the case of Kerala
being an example.
5.1 Learning in the process of disseminating the CF
In India, the colonial legacy still dominates HRM in the public sector (Budhwar, 2009). Nevertheless, the needs of a
modern democracy such as India are very different from those in the colonial era; this requires innovative thinking in
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achievement has continually become a central element in recruitment, the promotion of public administrators is
largely determined based on their seniority. Trainings for public administrators are focused on making them aware of
the existing rules and regulations, and helping them to discharge hierarchical accountability. Key concerns in discharg-
ing public sector accountability have been to control the misuse of authority, and to provide assurances regarding the
appropriate use of both authority and resources. There is insufficient scope for fresh ideas and innovative ways of
enhancing downward accountability. Furthermore, in an absence of continuous learning, there has been an element
of complacency in the public sector, which has hindered the performance of public administrators and innovation. For
instance, during our interviews, a retired public administrator stated:
Even today, recruitment is not seen as a means to address performance and functional gaps in service delivery
and administration. The commonmindset in society, politics and among decision-makers is that the government
has a mandate to provide employment within itself. There is absolutely no desire amongst administrators to
learn and improve performance, as these have nothing do with their career progression.
Adhering to traditional hierarchical accountability, two deficiencies are striking in the day-to-day functioning of
public administration. Firstly, public administrators are unaware of the fact of what services they are expected to
offer, what their duties and responsibilities are, and what training and development they require to improve their
performance. Next, public administrators are unable to cope with changes that are occurring throughout Indian
society. Economic growth, coupled with the technological advancement that the country has experienced in recent
years, has altered the citizens’ demands for accountability and their aspirations for better public services. Citizens
have becomemore vocal in calling for their rights and services, which they are entitled to receive from the government.
Social media hasmade it much easier for them to express their collective voices on issues of public sector performance
and accountability. The way that public administration functions in the country has therefore caused increasing
dissonance in society. The lack of learning in public administration, as a means of addressing such changes in society,
is striking. Commenting on the perceived gap in public sector performance and citizens’ expectations, an experienced
officer with the Police Department stated:
I know the citizens are nowmore vocal, especially after the Right to Service Act, but we need better mechanisms
and competence to cope with their increasing demand. I have never offered any trainings to acquire specific
competences and skills useful to address the changing public demands. Post-recruitment trainings available to
us are confined to helping us perform the role of a traditional police officer. There is more emphasis on achieving
physical fitness rather than any specific skills.
It has been long realised in Kerala that formal directives, regulations, and procedures relating to public-sector HRM
are outdated, and that they cannot address the accountability demands posed by the changing environment. A drive to
introduce a dynamic learning culture has already gained momentum in the state, as part of delivering improved public
services to the citizens. For instance, a faculty member of the IMG stated:
Since 2004, we have had a clear set of operational guidelines for developing the state government’s human
resources. We have also laid down the road map for strengthening and streamlining the capacity-building of
public administrators. However, we were looking for some tools/mechanisms to implement the guidelines and
roadmap.
It is therefore not surprising that the CF appears to be an important element in setting up a culture of continuous
learning. Having gained the approval of the state government, the IMG instigated an ambitious initiative of piloting
the CF in three state departments, the Police, Social Justice, and Scheduled Tribes Development, which have a high
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rate of citizen interaction. The IMG’s prior working relationship with these departments was also an important factor
in the selection of these departments; the following statement of an IMG senior programme officer serves as an
example:
We selected these three departments (Police, Social Justice and Scheduled Tribes) because we have been liaising
with them in many different training activities, which were part of the State Training Policy, since 2004. We
have learned that it is important to introduce our action research in familiar territories, where the possibility of
deriving outcomes, at least in action research terms, is more plausible.
Intervieweesmentioned that the key issue in the piloting process was not only adopting the CF, but also converging
these piloting departments into learning organisations. This also impliesmotivating individual public administrators to
embrace the required competencies, to acquire learning abilities, and to become innovative. A consultant working for
the IMG stated:
It not surprising that in India and other emerging economies, traditional management approaches are prevalent
in the public sector. If there are any learning and changes, these would occur at the top level and cascaded down
to lower levels in the forms of new regulations and directives. Learning at the cutting-edge level is therefore
confined to following such regulations. This is what we wanted to change in these piloting departments in the
process of implementing the CF.We want each individual administrator to think about his/her performance and
role in sustaining good performance.
The dissemination process itself was articulated as a learning exercise for the IMG, the adopting departments,
and the administrators representing these departments. For instance, at the outset, task forces were formed by
identifying the individuals who were knowledgeable about the departments; these groups incorporated both the
internal and external stakeholders. Indeed, the task force members were the crux of the activity to develop the CF.
The systems were implemented to ensure that the members were appropriately incentivised. In the next stage, all
available literature that referred to orders, communications, standing instructions, and oral traditions concerning
each cadre/category of personnel, was studied and analysed. This, in turn, led to the identification of desirable
competencies through a series of consultative workshops; here, the task force members debated and identified the
vital competencies required for executing the key duties and responsibilities that were entrusted to and expected of
the employees/cadres. One erstwhile member of the task force commented:
We were told during the task force discussions to elucidate to our colleagues in the department the importance
of having competencies, setting up a learning culture which could help us obtain such competencies, and
executing them in service delivery and discharging accountability.
Unlike many other countries, where the emphasis was on setting competencies for the top echelon, mainly
to recruit new staff members—for example, in the Belgian and the Flemish governments (Brans & Hondeghem,
2005)—the principle underlying the CF in Kerala was to cover the entire HRM cycle and cadres at all levels. This
was considered paramount in terms of sustaining the continuous learning culture and organisational intelligence. An
assistant professor at the IMG remarked:
Our objective was to enable the use of the CF in every aspect of HR management in the public sector, across
the life cycle of the employees and various cadres. For instance, it should help us in deciding recruitment,
capacity development, promotion and re-employment, rewards and penalties, pay structures and performance
evaluation. In short, all dimensions of the HR could be anchored on the CF, should we wish to develop and
reinforce the intelligence.
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The departmental approaches were followed in disseminating the CF with a view to inducing learning. The process
started by identifying all duties and responsibilities assigned to each cadre in the department, and determining the
competencies needed to discharge each of these duties and responsibilities. The competencies needed for performing
the duties were evaluated and assigned weightage by an engaging process with stakeholders consisting of task force
members, peer groups, and by client reviews to ascertain and validate their significance. For instance, while the CF
for the Scheduled Tribes Development Department was being disseminated, two new competencies (hitherto absent
in the competency dictionary issued by the Government of India) were additionally developed and added to the
framework during the process of consultation. In a similar vein, the CF was developed for 17 categories of the Local
Self-Government (Panchayats) Department; for 20 categories of the Social Justice Department; and for six categories,
including cadres of women, in the Police Department.
The dissemination of the CFwasmore deliberative in the Local Self-Government Department, reflecting on lessons
learned from previous departments where the CFwas initially piloted. A professor at the IMG explained:
We also selected retired officers in the task force, given their wealth of professional experience and availability.
Next, we realised that a one-full-day workshop was not effective, as the participants were distracted after
lunch concerned more about return to their homes and confirming transportation. We have started organising
workshops of at least two days’ duration, offering the participants accommodation for an overnight stay.
An underlying idea was that the dissemination of the CFwould require administrators to continually learn, in order
to achieve the required competencies for delivering public services. TheCFwas envisaged as a toolwithwhich to rede-
fine public sector accountability, prioritising learning and catering to the requirements of public services. However,
a significant number of state departments are yet to be convinced of the pertinence of the CF, and various forms of
resistance have been experienced in the process of disseminating the CF across state departments. Therewas a lack of
momentum amongst the Personnel Department of the state government to capitalise upon this pioneering initiative,
and to promote the CF as “the intelligence of democracy” (Bovens, 2007; Lindblom, 1965) in a comprehensive manner
across the departments.
5.2 Factors impeding learning in the process of dissemination
Despite the initial support at the central and state levels, the established organisational culture appears to be a
major impediment in disseminating the CF across state departments. This is perhaps unsurprising, as learning is more
effective in young organisations, because they have to be both proactive and responsive to their milieu, to ensure
survival and progression (Brodtrick, 1998). Setting up a dynamic learning environment while introducing reforms is
rather arduous in public sector entities, as they are bound by rigid rules, regulations, and bureaucratic procedures.
Public sector entities need to make the citizens aware of the underlying meanings, purposes, and procedures of the
reforms before their dissemination. Ambiguities in understanding and interpreting the term “competency,” and the
limited role that the central and state-level governments have played in addressing such complexities, have certainly
limited the dissemination of the CF. For instance, a project consultant at the IMG commented on the failure of public
administrators to understand the very essence of the CF:
Public administrators had different ideas about competencies, and they kept on shifting. For some people, a
competency turned out to be academic degrees, and others envisaged it as having specific and professional skills,
including IT and accountancy. Some police officers even understood it as a skill required to identify suspects.
Both the central and state governments were more concerned with the adoption of the CF being focused on the
policy level. The lack of guidelines on relevant practices has limited the process of creating a conducive learning envi-
ronment inwhich learning becomes a part of an ongoing process. For instance, the central government has signalled its
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support for the CF by incorporating it in its national human resource strategy and allocating a budget for training. A
total budget of ₹ 1.14 crore (approximately 1.6million USD) was allocated based on the IMG’s proposal to the Depart-
ment of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances, functioning under the auspices of the Office of the Prime
Minister of India, to continue the CF project for four years (2014–2018) (IMG, 2018). A retired public administrator
remarked:
This does reinforce the fact that the government is convinced of the potential of the CF to re-engineer the
human resource management of the country. However, the allocated budget is nothing compared to the millions
invested in administrative reforms over the years. Changes such as the CF should be viewed as an ongoing
process to be institutionalised and be part of an annual budget.
At the state level, the support offered at the outset was confined to translating the competency dictionary into
local Malayalam. However, in the process, the then chief secretary emerged as a learning champion, by encouraging
the extension of the CF to other departments, in particular the Local Self-Government (Panchayats) Department.
Commenting on the efforts of the Chief Secretary, a deputy director of the Local Self-Government Department stated:
We were lucky that the incumbent Chief Secretary enabled us to pilot the CF. Otherwise, it is hard to imagine
that the innovative HRmechanisms such as the CFwould be approved, let alone appreciated by our department,
which is largely driven by traditional values and local accountability relationships.
Such initiatives by the central and state governments were, however, inadequate in terms of disseminating the CF
across departments and setting up a learning culture. For instance, the institutional structure in public administration
has persisted, in which public administrators continue to be evaluated based on their adherence to rules and their
commitment to avoiding risks. Nomechanismshave been introduced that incentivise public administrators to generate
bottom-up feedback regarding their performance, or to rethink accountability based more on the learning aspects.
Interviewees mentioned that those who attended the dissemination workshops represented a minority group in their
respective departments; the following statement from a Local Self-Government Department participant serves as an
example:
You will find very few administrators willing to embed new ideas, listen to mechanisms for improvements,
and learn new ways of discharging accountability. When I return to my department after participating in the
disseminated workshops, I am ignored and discouraged by others, as they have no desire to learn about the CF.
Public administrators lacked both motivation and the necessity to act proactively and respond to the CF. Instead,
there were questions about the significance of introducing the CF without any attempt at altering the existing
structure of public administration. A programme officer at the Social Justice Department stated:
There is no dearth of policies and prescriptions regarding the professionalising and improving accountability
of public administrators. What we need is not new measures, but the political and administrative will for
improvements and amore engaging environment.
Limited interactions and motivation imply that the CF continued to appear as an elusive concept for a vast
majority of public administrators, mainly the middle and lower level groups. This limited awareness of the CF and its
accountability implications was reflected in the statement by a supervisor at the Social Justice Department:
Don’t you think that competencies in a particular job/responsibility may impact our transfer to other jobs and
affect vertical mobility? How can I gain different and newer competencies each time I get transferred to different
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offices and positions? Does this mean my career as a civil servant is just to learn different competencies until I
get retired?
The limited awareness of the CF was more striking in the Local Self-Government Department, which regulates
about 1,000 “panchayats” (villages) scattered across the state. We also found evidence of this while observing the CF
dissemination workshops for the Local Self-Government officers, held in March 2018 and 2019. Each panchayat has
developed and institutionalised its practices in terms of delivering public services and settling public grievances. Such
practices have remained static, even though society is continually evolving. Conceding that the CF has failed to replace
such practices and to introduce a learning culture, a lead consultant at the IMG stated:
I agree we have not been able to sell the ideas of the CF yet. A large number of administrators are either unaware
of or do not care about the significance of the CF in re-engineering the human resources policy in the department.
This shows our failures in selling the idea, or the fact that departmental resistance was significant enough even
to endanger thinking of innovations.
During our interviews, several other issues werementioned that have impinged on the extension of the CF, and the
learning associated with it, across the state departments. Central to these difficulties lies the influence and engage-
ment of trade unions and other associations in HRM; an issue that has drawn much attention in postindependence
India. Innovations and modernisations are often envisaged as a threat to the job security of public administrators and
trade unions, and various other religious and cultural associations have provided them with reasons for resisting new
initiatives. The following statement by a former secretary to government (a high-ranking bureaucrat) serves as an
example:
Changes mean a problem for public administrators. They are concerned that they might lose jobs and their
dominance, and may be burdened with additional responsibilities. They do not see any point in making their life
difficult by embracing changes.
A secretary at the Local Self-Government Department added:
Everyone is influenced by some organisations, ranging from trade unions to religious associations. The supervi-
sors, peers, actually no one, really appreciate the fresh inputs. I am not saying that the measures such as the CF
would never be implemented, but it will not happen in the next few years.
A lack of consistency in transfer policies has served as another obstacle to acceptance of the CF. Although both the
Code of Ethics 2013 and several other regulations—for instance, the pathways for an Inclusive Indian Administration
(PIA) 2014—state that there should be a gap of up to 5 years after each transfer is made, such provisions are rarely
put into practice. The prevalence of patronage and party-based politics has enabled public administrators to influence
the higher level officers and politicians; furthermore, and they get frequent transfers to offices wheremore spaces are
available to cater for their interests; for instance, by working closer to home and family members. Commenting on the
challenges caused by the frequent transfers of public administrators, an associate fellow at the IMG, under deputation
from the state secretariat observed:
In the department studied, we initiated communication with a certain set of people, but after six months, when
we returned to the department, we found a completely different team. Administrators who had attended our
workshops and with whomwe had established a relationship had all been dispersed and transferred to different
places, making the task more challenging.
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A key issue, however, concerns the institutionalised mindset of public administrators in assuming their superiority
in the society. Public administrators, once they are appointed to their jobs, tend to perceive themselves as superior in
terms of knowledge and the positions they occupy. The prevailing system of recruiting public administrators is based
on the performance in the civil service exam, which is reckoned to be one of most stringent in the region (Budhwar,
2009; Haq, 2012); this makes them behave more as an elite, exclusive group, rather than as public servants. The
accountability relationships with citizens, and learning attitudes, are therefore almost nonexistent within the vast
majority of administrators. An assistant professor from the IMG remarked:
These bureaucrats are like the cream of the cream (academically), so they often perceive that they are in a better
position to guide people rather than listen to them. For the CF to be a success, serving the public (accountability)
should be made a key criterion that the stakeholders could evaluate objectively and purposively.
A civil police officer from the Police Department added:
It is just a waste of time and resources trying to change the existing cadre through the CF, unless there is this kind
of backing from the polity. The best alternative could be to amend the recruitment criteria, and try to adopt the
CF in stages by roping in the new recruits rather than the serving administrators/police officers.
We identified that the perceived stability in government employment has further limited the desire to learn, and
contributed to complacency amongst public administrators. In the state of Kerala, as well as in other states, govern-
ment employment has continued to represent a form of stability and social prestige. It has also become a pathway for
administrators to gain better career opportunities in the private sector after their retirement; the following statement
by an assistant director at the Local-Self Government Department provides an example:
I am not worried about all these reforms. Having worked for 20 years in different roles, I know these are more
about talk rather than action. However, I want to engage in all these workshops, to build on my CV for my
post-retirement career in the private sector andmulti-national enterprises.
In the IMG’s reports, several benefits of theCFhavebeenoutlined for departments, higher level officers, employees,
different levels of governments, and citizens (IMG, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2018). However, following our conversations
with public administrators and officerswho represent different departments, such benefits are far frombeing realised,
and have remained elusive. We observed that although the CF is central to learning accountability, this notion of
accountability is virtually non-existent in the public sector of India in general, and Kerala in particular. The existing
structure of public administration itself prevents any initiatives that call for learning and engagementwith the citizens.
The fact that public administrators regard themselves as superior to the citizens, both in terms of knowledge and
authority, means that establishing and practising learning accountability is not in demand. Political patronage, along
with issues such as the influence of trade unions and different associations, an absence of communication flows,
and a lack of consistency in managing public administrators, have further limited the significance of any reforms and
innovations, the materialisation of which requires a dynamic culture of continuous learning—of which the CF is just
one element.
6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Drawing on the theoretical insights from learning accountability, we have in this paper studied the development of
the CF in the Indian state of Kerala, and the challenges encountered in its dissemination in four state departments.
The CF has widely been applied by private enterprises for the effective implementation of HR bundles and to
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improve organisational performance (Gooderham et al., 2008; Vos et al., 2015). Its application is also linked to wider
cultural changes in HRM and the institutionalisation of learning accountability (Brans & Hondeghem, 2005; Horton,
2000; Lodge & Hood, 2005; Nybø, 2004). In the public sector, the CF is reckoned to be an alternative to traditional
job-based approaches (Horton, 2000; Hyndman & Lapsley, 2016; Nybø, 2004) and hierarchal accountability. The CF
has, however, drawn relatively little attention in the public sector, compared to other managerial and governance
reforms prescribed by the NPM and NPG. Public sector reforms, in general, and in emerging economies, in particular,
have often resulted in unintended consequences, leading to an accountability crisis (Hagbjer et al., 2017; Van Helden
& Uddin, 2017; Wiesel & Modell, 2014). While the earlier crisis was mainly caused by accountability deficits, more
recently, public sector entities and administrators have been encountering a situation of accountability overload,
where different accountability arrangements are layered upon one another (Bovens et al., 2008; Ferry et al., 2015;
Virtanen et al., 2018). This has put public administrators in a situation of conflicts and tensions, and made them
resistant to learning and reforms. By examining the CF as a tool for inducing learning accountability, we have provided
in-depth explanations for the accountability crisis in emerging economy contexts.
In the Indian state of Kerala, four state departments have experimented with the CF as an important learning
and accountability tool, which has the potential to transform the adopting departments into intelligent organisations
(Bovens et al., 2008). The aim was to use the CF to determine competencies needed to perform the assigned duties,
and help the administrators acquire such competencies by setting up a culture of continuous learning (IMG, 2014,
2018). Insights into self-performance and the opportunity to self-evaluate the performance through external feedback
were envisaged as central benefits of the CF, which would encourage administrators to search for intelligent ways of
delivering services to the citizens (Bovens, 2007).Wehave identified that the dissemination and implementation of the
CF across the departments has itself become a learning process, which engages awide range of stakeholders, including
public administrators, at different levels, and involves collectively identifying competencies for each assigned role
and responsibility. This, however, has not been effective in altering the existing administrative structure and culture,
including the civil society’s reluctance to accept reforms, in which learning was insignificant.
An important finding of the paper is perhaps the manifestation of the ambiguities in the acceptance of learning
as a form of accountability in India, as well as in other contexts (Bovens, 2007, 2010; Bovens et al., 2008; Hagbjer
et al., 2017). Learning was more adaptive than deliberate at the central and state levels, as the focus was on the
adoption of the CF, rather than on creating a conducive environment that could motive public administrators to
embrace the CF and engage in obtaining competencies. The learning initiatives instigated by the IMG in the process of
disseminating the CFwere stifled, as these hadminimal impact on diverting administrators from the existing structure
of accountability, which emphasised compliance and the control by authorities. The CF continued to be an elusive
concept, while local practices driven by political patronage, red tape, and trade unions and associations persisted, and
the public administrators’ mindset that privileged their superiority remained intact. Rather than being a learning tool,
the CF appeared to be more of a threat to the employment and tenure of public administrators, and it was perceived
as another layer of burdensome reforms.
The paper contributes to the public sector accountability literature in several ways. First, the paper provides an
in-depth explanation of how administrative contexts and structures interact with the accountability reforms and
result in unintended consequences, mainly in emerging economy contexts. The reforms undertaken in the public
sector across countries are often justified in the name of improving governance and accountability (Hagbjer et al.,
2017; Hyndman & Liguori, 2016). Different accountability arrangements are discussed when proposing NPM and
NPG reforms that range from managerial and output-oriented to social accountability-based (Ahrens & Ferry, 2015;
Alawattage & Azure, 2019; Hyndman & Liguori, 2016). However, a key element that has a substantive impact on
improving accountability, namely, continuous learning, has been given limited attention. The Kerala experience shows
that despite acceptance at the policy level, reforms such as the CF, which are intended to instigate learning, in fact,
generate fear, tension, and resistance when they are cascaded down to administrators in the form of policies and
directives, particularly in the absence of collective understanding and a lack of a learning culture (Brodtrick, 1998).
We argue that there is a need to establish a learning environment prior to the dissemination and implementation
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of reforms that offer public administrators the opportunity to learn and exchange ideas in multiple ways—such as
through networking, dialoguing, informal training, and sharing insights within the cluster of administrators who are
working in the same department and doing similar work.
Next, we argue that imposing public administrator accountability reforms such as the CF would be meaningless
unless an emphasis is placed on learning accountability. The latter has been relatively marginalised within wider
discussions of NPM and NPG in the last decades. As stated by Lindblom (1965), learning accountability serves as “the
intelligence of democracy,” a fact that has largely been ignored when pursuing reforms in the public sector, mainly
in emerging economies. There is still a widespread belief in many emerging economies, India serving as an example,
that public sector reforms are a top-down process, and that the middle and lower level administrators are seen more
as obstacles rather than facilitators of reforms. In fact, learning at the middle and lower levels of administration
is restricted to obeying rules and regulations, and accountability is discharged by complying with these rules and
regulations. As stated by Brodtrick (1998, p. 85), there is a need to “unlearn” or “discard” such traditional compliance-
oriented accountability practices, by elucidating to public administrators the fact that public accountability also
implies continuous learning and institutionalising a culture of learning.
The fact that traditional attitudes, behaviours, and culture demotivate public sector entities to pursue learning and
innovations when they face the situation of funding constraints and austerity is discussed in prior work (Ferry et al.,
2017). Such studies, however, have been conducted in the context of developed countries. A few studies conducted
in the United Kingdom also demonstrate the fact that austerity and funding cuts may also on some occasions induce
learning in the public sector (Ahrens & Ferry, 2015; Ferry & Ahrens, 2017; Ferry et al., 2017, 2019). For instance,
public sector entities may learn to focus more on generating public value, promoting grassroots participation in
policymaking, and instigating corporate governance mechanisms. However, the continuity of such learning efforts
has raised doubts, as they appear to be concurrently driven by the motives of obtaining grassroots legitimacy by
transferring the blame to dwindling public services, and by the citizenry’s anger at funding cuts by the central gov-
ernment (Ferry & Ahrens, 2017). It should be noted that the context of our research setting, Kerala, is unique even
in the context of emerging economies, given the provision of high levels of social development and literacy. However,
even in Kerala, we noticed the challenges faced in establishing a culture of learning accountability; this topic warrants
further research in diverse contexts, to broaden our understanding of the observed accountability crisis in the public
sector.
NOTES
1 The Institute of Management in Government is the Apex Administrative Training Institute in Kerala. This institute also has a
mandate to act as the think tank of the state government. The institute has the chief secretary of the state as its president.
2 Many of these reports available online in the webpage of Institute of Management in Government. http://img.
kerala.gov.in/index.php/2015-03-03-05-41-14/study-reports
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a) Documents reviewed 2
• AReport of the 3rd Administrative Reforms Commission, Government of Kerala, 2008.
• The Right to Service Charter, Government of Kerala, 2012
• The Pathways for an Inclusive Indian Administration (PIA), 2014.
• Civil services competency dictionary, GOI-UNDP Project: Strengthening Human Resource Management of Civil
Service. Government of India, 2014.
• CF for civil servants at the cutting-edge level: Scheduled Tribes Development Department. IMG, Kerala, 2016
• Competency framework for civil servants at the cutting-edge level: Social Justice Department. IMG, Kerala, 2016.
• Handbook on duties and responsibilities for cutting-edge level officers: Police Department. IMG, Kerala, 2016.
• AReport of the 4th Administrative Reforms Commission, Government of Kerala, 2016.
• State Training Policy, Government of Kerala, 2017.
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• Competency framework for functionaries at the cutting-edge level: Local Self Government Department—
Panchayats. IMG, Kerala, 2018.
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